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The Supreme Court’s Limited Public
Forum
Sonja R. West*
Abstract
When discussing the issue of transparency at the United
States Supreme Court, most commentators focus on the line
between public and private. Yet, transparency is not always such a
black-or-white issue. There are, in fact, a surprising number of
significant Court moments that occur neither wholly in public nor
completely in private. Through policies that obstruct access by the
general public and exploit real-world limitations on the press and
practitioners, the justices have crafted a grey area in which they
can be “public,” yet only to select audiences. The effect is that few
outside the courtroom ever learn about these moments, even
though they technically occurred in public. By operating in this
semi-public sphere, the justices have robbed the public of
important information about the workings of its Court. This essay
adds to the ongoing discussion about transparency by exploring
the Court’s “limited public forum” and the ways the justices have
found to hide in plain sight.
On the last day of the 2014 term, the United States Supreme
Court announced its decision in Glossip v. Gross,1 a closely
watched case about the constitutionality of lethal injections.2 As
is Court practice, the author of the majority opinion—in this case
Justice Samuel Alito—read his bench statement, and Justices
Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer followed by reading their
respective dissents.
Things then took a curious turn. Justice Antonin Scalia, who
had concurred with the majority, suddenly announced that he
* Otis Brumby Distinguished Professor of First Amendment Law,
University of Georgia School of Law.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
2. See generally id.
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also wished to speak.3 He began by responding to some of
Breyer’s arguments about the death penalty but later made
seemingly gratuitous references to the Court’s same-sex marriage
case from the week before.4
There are many bizarre things about this moment. It is
exceedingly rare for concurrences to be read from the bench, and
it was a break in Court protocol for Scalia, a justice in the
majority, to follow the dissenters. The substance of Scalia’s oral
statement was also unusual, because it differed in noteworthy
ways from his written concurrence and because he mixed in
discussion of an unrelated case. Perhaps the strangest and most
striking part, however, was that Scalia appeared to be speaking
without notes, giving the impression that his statement was
spontaneous and, perhaps, a surprise to everyone—including his
fellow justices.5
Yet, despite this highly peculiar behavior by a Supreme
Court justice, the episode went largely unreported. Most news
outlets ignored it. A handful of reporters noted only that it was
uncommon to have so many opinions read from the bench and
especially odd for one to be a concurrence. Two reports mentioned
Scalia’s blurred discussions of lethal injection and same-sex
marriage.6 And only one wrote that Scalia spoke out of turn
(seemingly spontaneously) and strayed considerably from his
written opinion.7
3. See Irin Carmon, Scalia Protests Gay Marriage Ruling in Unrelated
Case, MSNBC (June 29, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/scaliaprotests-gay-marriage-ruling-again-unrelated-dissent (last visited Jan. 4, 2017)
(discussing Justice Scalia’s unusual and unexpected comments) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Dahlia Lithwick, Scalia Goes Off Script,
SLATE
(June
29,
2015,
2:16
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/featur
es/2015/scotus_roundup/scalia_in_glossip_v_gross_supreme_court_decision_okla
homa_may_kill_using.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Lithwick, supra note 3 (noting Scalia’s remarks referencing
Obergefell v. Hodges).
5. This also might explain why only his statement of all the justices who
spoke was not distributed to the press.
6. Carmon, supra note 3; Lithwick, supra note 3.
7. See Carmon, supra note 3 (“Normal protocol at the Supreme Court is
for the justice who is in the majority to summarize his or her opinion from the
bench . . . . Although Scalia has dissented from the bench . . . the fact that he did
so within a concurring opinion made the move all the more astonishing.”).
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What was the significance of Scalia’s odd bench statement?
Was it news? Was it law? Was it an official act of a powerful
government actor? The answer seems to be all of the above and
none of the above. How is this possible? It is possible because
Scalia’s statement occurred inside the Court’s transparency zone
of twilight. Events inside the zone of twilight are technically
public—the press and some members of the public were present—
but few outside the courtroom learn of them.
Over the years, the justices have developed a number of ways
to be able to hide in plain sight. By embracing policies that
obstruct access by the general public and exploit real-world
limitations on the press and practitioners, the justices have
carefully crafted a grey area in which they can be “public” in
theory, yet available only to select audiences in practice.
Bench statements are a prime example of the justices’ unique
limited public forum and their fuzzy official-but-also-unofficial
acts. Bench statements are, of course, unofficial in that they have
no precedential value. They cannot be cited in another case or to
another court with any force. The authoritative work of the
Supreme Court lies, as we know, within the four corners of the
text of its opinions.
There are nonetheless important implications in the actions
and words of Supreme Court justices, particularly when they are
spoken on the bench while court is in session. Professor Lani
Gunier, for example, has argued that the justices’ oral dissents
can lead to action by non-judicial actors such as lawmakers and
the public at large.8 Professors Christopher Schmidt and Carolyn
Shapiro agree that bench statements can spark or augment
important public dialogues.9
Sometimes it is not so much what the justices say but how
they act in their limited public forum that raises a matter of
public concern. When Justice John Paul Stevens spoke in a
“halting fashion” during an oral dissent in 2010, it led to
8. See Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122
HARV. L. REV. 4, 49 (2008) (“T]he dissenting opinion speaks to non-judicial
actors, whether legislators, local thought leaders, or ordinary people, and
encourages them to step in or step up to revisit the majority's conclusions.”).
9. See Christopher W. Schmidt & Carolyn Shapiro, Oral Dissenting on the
Supreme Court, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 128–29 (2010) (analyzing the
“long and rich history of dramatic and emotional dissents from the bench”).
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speculation of his retirement.10 And in some cases, justices have
been observed making eye contact with lawyers and parties as
they read their bench statements, either in perceived solidarity
with11 or opposition to12 their causes. At other times it seems the
justices’ actions are directed at a colleague.13
Media coverage of these semi-public occurrences is uneven.
Some incidents reach an outside audience,14 while others
evaporate into thin air.15 It is unclear why members of the
Supreme Court press corps often fail to report on such moments.
Perhaps they fear losing future access to the justices. Maybe they
feel that describing ambiguous moments crosses the line from
objective reporter to biased commentator. Or, most likely, they
simply have real-world limitations on how much coverage they
can give to the Court.
10. See Adam Liptak, After 34 years, a Plainspoken Justice Gets Louder,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at A12 (“[Justice Stevens] has given signals that he
intends to retire at the end of this term, and his dissent on Thursday was shot
through with disappointment, frustration and uncharacteristic sarcasm.”).
11. See, e.g., Gunier, supra 8, at 10 n.21 (quoting Charles Ogletree as
stating that, when Justice Breyer read his dissent in Parents United, Breyer
“was looking right at us as he was reading his dissent” and that “[t]his was his
coming out as a dissenter” (citing Telephone Interview with Charles Ogletree,
Jesse Climenko Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (June 17, 2008))).
12. See Dahlia Lithwick, As Kennedy Read his Opinion Friday Morning,
Attendees Were Quiet, Anxious, Relieved, SLATE (June 26, 2015, 1:15 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/20
15/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2015_the_mood_as_anthony_kennedy_read_
his_opinion.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (describing Chief Justice Roberts as
directing his dissent toward “the array of civil rights lawyers seated before
him”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Garrett Epps, Justice Alito's Inexcusable Rudeness, ATLANTIC
(June 24, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/justicealitos-inexcusable-rudeness/277163/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (noting Alito’s
“mini-tantrum” while Justice Ginsburg read her dissent) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Epps noted that because Alito’s “display of
rudeness” was silent, it “will not be recorded in transcript or audio; but it was
clear to all with eyes, and brought gasps from more than one person in the
audience.” Id.
14. See Schmidt and Shapiro, supra note 9, at 77–78 (describing Breyer’s
dissent in the 2007 case of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 as “widely quoted” and “a key element of public discussions
about the case”).
15. Id. at 79 (“Oral dissents thus become prominent parts of public
discussion or debate only when the press or other extrajudicial actors find in the
dissent a storyline that helps dramatize an otherwise attractive narrative.”).
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The easiest way to pop the justices’ semi-public bubble, of
course, would be to allow video recording of court sessions. Video
that was either live-streamed or quickly released would free the
public from its reliance on third parties to get timely information.
Yet the justices have continually ignored calls for video or even
live-audio coverage of Court sessions including opinion
announcements.16 They have maintained this hardline stance
even though the primary arguments against cameras at oral
arguments make little sense when applied to announcement
days. For example, fears that justices and lawyers will
grandstand or that the public will misunderstand the proceedings
do not apply to the reading of short, prepared summaries.
Yet rather than allow additional access to opinion
announcements, as logic would dictate, the Court has chosen to
restrict it even more. Audio of the Court’s oral arguments, for
example, are released weekly on the Court’s website,17 but audio
of the bench statements are not made available until the
beginning of the following term (often many months later) and
even then only at the National Archives. Transcripts of oral
arguments, likewise, are released daily on the Court’s website,
but there are no official transcripts of bench statements.18
The Court’s restrictive policies on opinion announcements
seem at times to be almost designed to stop the public from
receiving timely and accurate information. They have led to
absurdities like the infamous “running of the interns”19 and
16. See, e.g., Jonathan Sherman, End The Supreme Court’s Ban on
Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, at A27 (advocating for the Court to allow cameras during
oral arguments and opinion announcements, but acknowledging that “[d]espite
countless entreaties over the years from groups calling for ‘sunshine’ and
‘transparency,’ and giant changes in technology and communication, the [C]ourt
has been unmoved”).
17. See
Argument
Audio,
SUP.
CT.
U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio.aspx (last visited
Jan. 4, 2017) (providing downloadable recordings of oral arguments) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See
Argument
Transcripts,
SUP.
CT.
U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 4, 2017) (providing downloadable transcripts of oral arguments) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See Erin Dooley, Running of the Interns: This is What a Mad Dash
Outside the Supreme Court Looks Like, ABC NEWS (June 25, 2015, 3:00 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/running-interns-mad-dash-supreme-
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incorrect news reports regarding the decisions in major cases.20
They also force reporters into the Cornelian dilemma of choosing
between either being in the courtroom, where they can observe
the justices firsthand but are cutoff from the outside world, or
staying outside the courtroom, where they can read the opinions
and communicate to the public but are unable to see the justices.
The Court has even implemented a new policy that prevents
organizations headed by licensed attorneys, like SCOTUSblog, 21
the popular electronic platform used by millions to follow Court
opinion announcements, from obtaining press credentials.22
According to Supreme Court reporter Tony Mauro, the
justices are “especially prickly” about access to opinion
announcements because justices who join an opinion do not sign
off on the bench summaries.23 Thus they “don’t want the opinion
announcements to be featured in the news media as an accurate
court/story?id=32024853 (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (“Because cameras aren’t
allowed inside the courtroom, interns, armed with hard copies of the opinion,
must dash across the plaza and down the steps to deliver the decision to the
network correspondents waiting to go live from the press pen – with hordes of
reporters, photographers, and protesters looking on.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See Tom Goldstein, We’re Getting Wildly Differing Assessments (July 7,
2012),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/were-getting-wildly-differingassessments/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (describing how both CNN and FoxNews
incorrectly reported the decision in National Federation of Businesses v.
Sebuilus).
21. Debra Cassens Weiss, SCOTUSblog Can't Get Supreme Court Press
Credentials Under New Policy; What About Denniston?, ABA J. (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scotusblog_cant_get_supreme_court_pre
ss_credentials_under_new_policy_what_a/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See Goldstein, supra note 20 (noting that the SCOTUSblog live blog
received more than 5 million hits during the announcement of National
Federation of Businesses v. Sebuilus); Corinne Grinapol, Lyle Denniston Leaves
SCOTUSblog
(Jun.
28, 2016),
http://www.adweek.com/fishbowldc/lyledenniston-leaves-scotusblog/157117 (describing SCOTUSblog’s inability to
secure press credentials) (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); .
23. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Urged to Allow Broadcast of Historic
Opinion Announcements, LEGAL TIMES (June 24, 2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202730341900/SupremeCourt-Urged-to-Allow-Broadcast-of-Historic-OpinionAnnouncements#ixzz3ftbJtIXe (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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representation of court decisions.”24 Indeed, according to
SCOTUSblog, it is the policy of the Court’s Public Information
Office only to release copies of bench statements to members of
the credentialed press with the curious warning that they may
not reproduce it.25
The justices, moreover, take all of these steps that shield
opinion announcements from public scrutiny despite the fact that
they clearly conflict with the public’s right to know. The reading
of a bench statement involves a Supreme Court justice, adorned
in his or her official Court regalia, ascending to the bench and
being introduced by the Chief Justice as announcing the Court’s
opinion in that case. This event occurs in open court and in front
of members of the public and the press. It is a tradition that
harkens back to the early practice of the Court issuing almost all
of its opinions orally and individually.26 Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a more official government act.
Yet, all too often, what happens in the courtroom, stays in
the courtroom. This creates one “reality” that exists inside and
another that is released to the world. Schmidt and Shapiro
noticed this insularity in their review of oral dissents. They found
that when justices make bench statements, they seem to be
speaking to “their colleagues, the law clerks, [and] the handful of
knowledgeable Court watchers in the room” and are “largely
motivated by emotional and interpersonal factors.”27 In other
words, the statements are for select insiders, not the public.
The justices’ sense of entitlement to the protection of their
quasi-public bubble follows them off the bench as well. They
24. Id.
25. See Amy Howe, A Reporter’s Guide to Covering the Same-sex Marriage
Cases at the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 20, 2015, 4:29 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/a-reporters-guide-to-covering-the-same-sexmarriage-cases-at-the-supreme-court/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (noting that
written copies of bench statements “are just for the use of the press and cannot
be published”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States
Supreme Court 1790–1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 140 (1999) (“In the
approximately sixty-three cases that Alexander Dallas reported for the years
1790-1800, the Court used a wide variety of opinion-delivery methods. The most
popular was stating that the opinion was being issued “By the Court,” without
any attribution to a particular Justice.”).
27. Schmidt & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 124–25.
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frequently make closed-door appearances to exclusive, private
groups.28 They conceal their public appearance schedules and
frequently ban cameras, recordings, or the press at their public
speeches.29
When it comes to the Supreme Court, transparency is not
always a black-or-white question of public versus private. There
instead exists a grey area in which the justices’ actions are visible
only to certain audiences. The Court has encouraged this semipublic sphere through policies that either cut off or delay more
practical avenues of public access and that exploit the unique
pressures on the press. Perhaps this is the justices’ way of having
the last word. Perhaps it creates plausible deniability when
something goes awry. Whatever the reason, it leaves the public
with a disturbingly incomplete and unofficial record of official
government acts.

28. See, e.g., Curt Levey, Ganging Up on Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
Alito,
AM.
SPECTATOR
(June
21,
2011,
10:08
AM),
http://spectator.org/articles/37501/ganging-justices-thomas-scalia-and-alito (last
visited Jan. 4, 2017) (describing Justice Thomas, Scalia, and Alito’s ties to the
Federalist Society) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Scalia Apologizes for Seizure of Recordings,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/13/us/scaliaapologizes-for-seizure-of-recordings.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (discussing
Scalia’s policies banning recordings of his public speeches for broadcast media)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

